Coelynn McIninch

Second Semester

March 2008 - Paper #2

Critical Theory Readings - Second Semester

If ever there were a case for inter-textual nature of art criticism, this semester’s readings would have it won. Not only were all of the readings about the same semiotic/semantic ideas, the readings also elaborated on, or directly referenced, one, or several, of the other texts. Interestingly enough, when the essays were read in the exact order assigned, the readings became one continuous dissertation on the fundamental building blocks of all creative endeavors. I have always been a bit squeamish when it comes to dissection but I am beginning to think that linguistic dissection could easily become a sick fascination. I found many new perspectives on the nature of my ideas and the materials I choose to represent them.

It was interesting to be assigned readings actually authored by the instructor. It is rare to be able to get precise clarification on an author’s intent. Michael Newman seems to be able to find incredible depth in the minutest acts. The resulting cognitive associations can be a bit overwhelming at times but, as I continue to study the subjects further, I am thankful for his thoroughness.

Michael’s first reading had to do with marks and drawings. This reading applies most closely to my “illegible writing.” (Barthes) My aim in creating the “Text Blocks” was to focus on the gesture of writing as way of communication. They are an acknowledgement of writing and words as expression but with the emphasis on the gesture as a way of reinserting emotion into the written forms to compensate for the alphabet’s signifying reduction of human experience. “It could be argued that what is at stake in this Regression is a refusal of the substitutability that marked the word, and the transparency of the sign in relation to meaning, possible.” (Newman)

The pieces are self-aware that it is merely the arrangement and expression of the marks that implies a language. The separate colors, sizes and directions or markings become an overlapping dialogue with no discernible definition beyond the basic interactions of the marks.. “ There are marks that contribute to, but which do not yet produce, signification - individual brushstrokes or lines, or dots, or pixels; and above that threshold these as yet nonsensmatic marks emerge as productive of meaning.” (Elkins) A mark can only be just a mark when there is no attempt to define contextualize or associate the mark

Julia Kristeva dramatically describes the reductive nature of Semiotics “as the place where the sciences die.” Semiotics is more the act of theorizing about theorizing than it is a separate science. According to Kristeva, “ . . . whatever semiology’s sign-object happens to be (gesture, sound, image, etc.,) it can only be known through language.” By fully defining the terms, that describe my intentions and creations I am becoming aware of their limitations and associations. I have begun to focus on these exposed faults, or rifts in understanding, in order to reveal the basic structure that supports the root ideas for my work. I hope to play definitions off of one another in poetic contrast and/or synergy. The revealed nature of my mediums or methods gives me clarity to establish logical parameters for my future creations.

With my sound boxes, I tried to create a symbolic model of the social confusion that occurs when several people use their cell-phones in close proximity, having private conversations in public spaces. What I discovered was that the sound and not the physical model more effectively conveyed my initial intent. It was the disembodied traces of conversation overlapping and melding together that transformed the piece into a symbol of technological noise and sign of social crowding. The majority of people who interact with the work hit all the buttons at once and become willing participants in the deconstruction of conversation. Blending all the messages together turned the human voices into a “cacophony” of human noise. I focused too much on the complex symbolism without paying attention to the basic idea that sparked my interest. The fact that I needed to use a standard version of the “push to talk” symbol to try and convey this idea should have given me some insight into the possible flaws in my design.

Levinas writes of “The Other” is such a way that it becomes obvious that our language and perhaps our culture are pitifully deficient when it comes to defining our existence. What intrigues me most are his theories regarding the face. He does not immediately describe the face as a mask but speaks of it as an indication of “The Other” explaining:” The manifestation of a face is the first discourse.” (Levinas) It is not by its representation of consciousness but by its existence as a tangible trace of the possibility of the existence of consciousness.

It is this possibility standing before conscious thought, the urge to make the intangible and indescribable known is what started me on my journey back into sculpture. The resulting piece was my “Medusa Cage” (another confusion of symbol, sign and model making.)

The most common question I received about the piece, even when I was building it, was “where did you get the face?” At first I thought it was simply people in disbelief that I was capable of sculpture. Now I am starting to realize that the face, the center of the sculpture, has no clear significance. Perhaps if I had cast a real human face I could have argued the insubstantiality of the physical self when in contact with technology. Instead, I inserted the cast of an anonymous face that was sculpted to fit the frame. The face is not perfectly smooth. It is flat on the back and obviously cast. Newman describes, “The cast as a direct reproduction of resemblance has an inevitable, anthropological connection with the death mask . . .” The face I sculpted is a symbol of humanness but bears no indexical relationship to a living being. The whole construction is a model, meant as a symbol of our disembodied minds attached to the constant streams of information. Using a fantastical face rather than a real cast preemptively eliminates the possibility of human cognition and any link to “The Other”.

My interest in emoticons was actually sparked by my discomfort with the absence of the human element in technology. The term emoticon is self-explanatory; the images are icons: “ . . . signs that establish meaning through the effect of resemblance.” (Krauss) They are representative of emotions that we cannot accurately express because of the apparent limitations of our technology. The emoticon is frozen emotion. The features of the face translated into signs and symbols, solidified in a distinct expression that is widely circulated and therefore, commonly recognizable. The meaning is not always known instinctively but may be easily explained through any number of information sites on the subject. Happy is no longer ”H-A-P-P-Y”, it is now J or :). Even word processing programs recognize certain character combinations as emoticons. (The smiley face above is courtesy of Microsoft Office’s auto spell-check.) Unlike the physical expression on a human face that could have any number of variable clues to it’s meaning, each emoticon has a specific meaning associated with it. The emoticon serves as a mask but not a death mask per se because there is no direct imprint. But it is an iconic mask used to imitate, or hide, actual emotion. According to Levinas “if signifying were equivalent to indicating, a face wouldn’t be important. The prevalence of and significant cultural differences in regards to the complexity and use of emoticons seems to indicate a need for the recreation of the human traits and the reinforcement of consciousness. This shift in communication from alphabet to visuals appears to be contrary to Kristeva’s studies of the transition in literature from symbol to sign. Online communication crosses several language borders necessitating a more universal mode of communication. The emoticon is just one way to bridge the gap.

Text messaging uses emoticons, punctuation and abbreviated words to create a whole new language by blending whatever signs and symbols are available to get the message across as quickly as possible. Txting is a social acknowledgement of the lack of humanness in technology and a collective realization of the alphabet as merely signifiers for sounds. Because sound and physical speech are not heavily used online, the need for proper enunciation is negated. Without accent, or intonation, meaning can be conveyed more effectively by stringing together the barest minimum of characters that may be recognizable as a word or idea. My work with txting is based on using a non-human element (transl8it.com) to convert traditionally orated texts, into txt language to emphasize the linguistic shift. I presented the translations on fine parchment as a statement of how these works may be preserved in the future if current language trends continue to mutate at this accelerated pace. After reading Kristeva’s work on language, I am truthfully confused as to how to classify what is happening to the English language due to our interactions with technology.

Andre Bazin’s “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” helped me to clarify my philosophies regarding film photography but inspired many more question when I tried to apply the same philosophies to the digital photograph. Bazin writes: “Photography enjoys a certain advantage in virtue of this transference of reality from the thing to its reproduction.” This is certainly true for film photography, not simply by resemblance but by physicality and presence. The film negative is created as a causal effect of being directly exposed to the subject. With digital photography this transference is theoretical rather than indexical. This is the very issue that bothers me and fuels my digital works.

A digital file of a scene does not necessarily mean that any given thing happened or exists. The nature of digital photography therefore, is not presence and history but translation and modification. Separated from the presupposition truth, a digital image is no longer bound by the conventions of truth. It is free to be as expressive as a painting. In Bazin’s opinion, film photography:“ . . . freed the plastic arts from their obsession with likeness.” Digital photography has relegated film photography to just that.

The digital file is merely a transcript of photographic sensor readings. It is a record of what was in front of the lens but not a direct imprint of the light. In order to view the image, it must be re-translated by the computer for a monitor and printer. The link between signifier and signified is further and further removed with each successive translation. The digital file becomes a trace, not of the presence of an object but a trace of the act of translating color into information. The digital file can never be physically part of history because it does not alter with age. It is not an active participant in time. It is only its manifestations that will be regarded and remembered as history. This brings into question Bazins comment: “ . . .photography does not create eternity, as art does, it embalms time.”

A psychological confusion and creative conflict occurs when an image created digitally is used in context that is against its nature and presented as indexical truth.

Even with the increased circulation of obviously altered images and expanded access to manipulation software, is still important to note “the irrational power of the photograph to bear away our faith.” (Bazin)

After absorbing this semester’s readings and applying them to my work, I am left with a much clearer concept of what disturbs me about cyberspace and communication technology in general. It is the sum of all traces of human action and interaction translated and stored. It is dead and yet still has a pulse and an effect. It does not age. It does not feel. Our voices are translated and recorded; our faces are solidified and interchangeable. It is an open space for the exchange if ideas and knowledge as well as a resource for social interaction but I can’t help but wonder what the long-term effects are of replacing face to face interactions with digitally mediated ones.

Works Cited:

Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981.

Bazin, André. "The Ontology of the Photographic Image." What is Cinema? Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, pp.9-16

Casey, Edward. "Levinas on Memory and the Trace", in J.C.Sallis, G. Moneta and J. Taminiaux eds., The Collegium Phaenomenologicum. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988, pp.240-255.

James Elkins. "Marks, Traces, Traits, Contours, Orli, and Splendores" On Pictures and the Words That Fail Them. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 3-46.

Krauss, Rosalind. "Notes on the Index" in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: MIT, 1985, pp.196-219.

Kristeva, Julia and Moi, Toril. "Linguistics, Semiotics, Textuality." The Kristeva Reader. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986,

Levinas, Emmanuel "The Trace of the Other," in Deconstruction in Context, ed. Mark Taylor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Newman, Michael. "Imprint and Rhizome in the Work of Cristina Iglesias," Iwona Blazwick ed., Cristina Iglesias Museu Serralves, Barcelona, Whitechapel Art Gallery, London, and Irish Museum of Modern Art, Dublin, 2002-03.

Newman, Michael. "The Traces and Marks of Drawing" in The Stage of Drawing: Gesture and Act. ed by Catherine de Zegher, London: Tate Publishing and New York: The Drawing Center, 2003, pp. 93-108.